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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE TAXATION CONSEQUENCES 
FOR RENOUNCING CITIZENSHIP 
WILLIAM THOMAS WORSTER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Very few states in the world, including the United States, impose a tax on 
persons who renounce their nationality, and this practice implicates the human 
right of expatriation. While one might think that a person who gives up his 
nationality would no longer have any tax obligations to his former state of 
nationality, this expatriation tax, or “exit tax,” imposes a tax event and 
potentially continuing tax obligations for years to follow. It might even chill the 
practice of renunciation as a tax avoidance scheme. However, international 
human rights law provides that every person has a right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to renounce and change his nationality. This Paper will 
examine whether the U.S. exit tax regime violates the international human right 
of expatriation. 
I.  U.S. EXIT TAX REGIME 
A U.S. citizen may renounce nationality1 and upon expatriation, the former 
U.S. national incurs a taxation consequence.2 When a person ceases to be a U.S. 
national, he or she also usually ceases to be a U.S. tax person,3 and thus the 
former national would no longer be subjected to taxation on his or her worldwide 
income, only U.S. source income, and would enjoy a lower rate on U.S.-source 
income.4 In an effort to reduce the attractiveness of renouncing nationality for 
 
* Lecturer, International Law, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The 
Netherlands; LL.M. (Adv.) in Public International Law, cum laude, Leiden University, Faculty of 
Law, Leiden, The Netherlands; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Modern European History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, 
Kansas. 
 1. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (2012) (“[A]ny act of 
expatriation under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act shall be presumed to have done 
so voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted . . . .”). 
 2. See I.R.C. § 877A (2012) (discussing tax responsibilities of expatriation). 
 3. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6) (2012). 
 4. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (2012) (nonresident aliens pay a thirty percent tax on U.S.-source 
income). 
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tax savings,5 Congress has passed a number of tax measures specifically aimed 
at U.S. citizens renouncing nationality,6 including the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),7 the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 (“AJCA”),8 and the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief 
Tax Act of 2008 (“HEART Act”).9  
The rules specially designed for expatriates subjected these former U.S. 
citizens to ten years of additional U.S. tax compliance.10 In those years, the 
former nationals were required to pay the higher of the regular tax regime or the 
special expatriate tax regime,11 which taxes U.S.-source income and income 
“effectively connected” with a U.S. trade or business,12 including investment 
portfolio income,13 interest,14 and capital gains from U.S. stocks and bonds.15 
There was also a special estate tax on U.S.-situs assets16 and a gift tax on U.S.-
situs intangible property.17  
 
 5. See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen, Kenneth Dart Forsakes U.S. for Belize, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 
1994, at C1 (reporting on the expatriation of Kenneth Dart, the billionaire heir to Dart Container); 
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Closing a Tax Loophole and Opening Another, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1995, 
at A1 (discussing legislative proposals to remedy expatriation problem); Michael Kinsley, Love It 
or Leave It, TIME, Nov. 28, 1994, at 95, 95 (comparing “taxpatriates” to draft dodgers); Robert 
Lenzner & Philippe Mao, The New Refugees, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 131, 131–32 (reporting 
that the expatriating people included Michael Dingman, a director of Ford Motor company, John 
“Ippy” Dorrance III, the heir to Campbell Soup, J. Mark Mobius, the billionaire emerging market 
investment manager, and Ted Arison, the founder of Carnival Cruise Lines); Brigid McMenamin, 
Flight Capital, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1994, at 55, 55. 
 6. See Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, §§ 103(f), 108(f), 109(a), 80 
Stat. 1539, 1551–54, 1573, 1574–75 (codified as amended at I.R.C §§ 877, 2107, 2501(a) (2012)); 
see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 138, 98 Stat. 494, 672 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7701(b) (2012)); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1234(a), 100 
Stat. 2085, 2565–66 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6039E (2012)). 
 7. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 
511, 110 Stat. 1936, 2093–2100 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 877). 
 8. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 
1569–70 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 877(a), (c)). 
 9. See Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-245, § 301, 
122 Stat. 1624, 1638–44 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 877A (2012)). 
 10. I.R.C. § 877(a)(1) 
 11. See generally I.R.C. §§ 871, 877 (2012). 
 12. I.R.C. § 871(b); see Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 375, 379 (2006). 
 13. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A); see Kirsch, supra note 12, at 379. 
 14. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A). A higher rate than would be imposed under I.R.C. § 871(h). 
 15. Gains that are not taxed for nonresident aliens under I.R.C. §§ 865, 871(a)(2) (2012). 
 16. See I.R.C. § 2107(b) (2012) (imposing tax on gains that are exempt from tax for 
nonresident aliens under I.R.C. §§ 2101, 2104, 2105 (2012)). 
 17. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(3) (2012) (imposing tax on gains that are exempt from tax for 
nonresident aliens under I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2)). 
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These rules applied if the expatriate’s “principle purpose” in renouncing 
nationality was to avoid taxation.18 Initially, the burden of proving this purpose 
fell on the IRS, but the AJCA abolished entirely the need to prove any purpose 
for the expatriation.19 Following this change, any “wealthy” person who 
renounced nationality would have an objective intent to avoid taxes.20 
“Wealthy” was defined as a person with an average annual tax of $124,000 for 
the previous five years21 or a net worth of $2,000,000.22 However, there are 
some exceptions for dual citizens from birth who have not had substantial 
contacts with the United States23 or were merely U.S. citizens by birth with 
neither parent being a U.S. citizen.24 These exceptions were lost, however, if the 
individual could not prove that he or she had been in full compliance with the 
Internal Revenue Code during the preceding five years25 or had been present in 
the United States for more than thirty days during any of the ten calendar years 
preceding expatriation26 and following the expatriation.27 
In 2008, Congress also enacted the HEART Act to impose a “mark-to-
market” tax on citizens renouncing citizenship28 so that expatriates would 
continue to pay normal U.S. income taxes on all unrealized gains that exceeded 
$600,000 on their worldwide assets.29 In addition, the IRS would now tax 
distributions from certain retirement plans at any time, not limited to ten years 
 
 18. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 
511(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2093 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 877(a) (2012)); I.R.C. § 877(f) 
(putting the burden on the individual renouncing citizenship to prove “that such loss of citizenship 
did not have for one of its principal purposes the avoidance of taxes”); see also Furstenberg v. 
Comm’r, 83 T.C. 755, 780 (1984). 
 19. See Kirsch, supra note 12, at 380 n.18. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (providing for an annual cost of living adjustment thereafter). 
 22. See id. However, the net worth measure does not benefit from an annual cost of living 
adjustment. Id. 
 23. See I.R.C. § 877(c)(2)(B). 
 24. See I.R.C. § 877(c)(3). 
 25. See I.R.C. § 877(a)(2)(C). 
 26. See I.R.C. § 877(g)(1). 
 27. See id. Although it is unclear, we can presume that this provision will also be interpreted 
to subject the expatriate to the U.S. person estate and gift taxes. 
 28. See Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-245, § 
301(a), 122 Stat. 1624, 1638 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 877A(a)(1)). 
 29. See I.R.C. § 877A(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012) (indexed for inflation); see also I.R.C. § 
877A(h)(2) (providing that long-term permanent residents who fall under the expatriation rules 
receive a stepped-up basis equivalent to the fair market value of the asset on the date of acquisition 
of permanent residency rather than the date of purchase). 
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following expatriation.30 There are similar exceptions for dual citizens with 
minimal connections to the United States.31 
II.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON CHANGING NATIONALITY 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) contains the basic 
human rights that all people enjoy. It states that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”32 The 
right to change nationality, or renounce nationality, was already included in the 
earliest drafts.33 Throughout the drafting process, various delegates continued to 
reaffirm that the right to change or renounce nationality was fundamental, and 
there was no opposition to these submissions.34 The various drafts always made 
 
 30. See I.R.C. § 877A. This rule does not include Individual Retirement Accounts, which are 
included in the mark-to-market system and therefore taxable at the time of expatriation. See I.R.C. 
§ 877A(e)(1). 
 31. See I.R.C. §§ 877(c)(2)(B), (c)(3); I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 32. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15(2) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 33. G.A. Res. 43 (I), U.N. Doc. A/234, at 68 (Dec. 11, 1946); U.N. Div. Human Rights, Draft 
Outline of International Bill of Rights, art. 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (June 4, 1947) (“The 
rights of emigration and expatriation shall not be denied.”); U.N. Div. Human Rights, Draft Outline 
of International Bill of Rights, art. 32, UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (June 4, 1947) (“Every one has a 
right to a nationality. Every one is entitled to the nationality of the State where he is born unless 
and until on attaining majority he declares for the nationality open to him by virtue of descent.”); 
Inter-Am. Juridicial Comm., Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man, art. 
9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2 (Jan. 8, 1947) (“Every person has the right to renounce the nationality of 
his birth, or a previously acquired nationality, upon acquiring the nationality of another state.”). 
 34. See U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 59th mtg. at 10–11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.59 (June 4, 1948) 
(“[Mr. Wilson of the United Kingdom] agreed with the suggestion made by the representative of 
Uruguay [Fontaina] that the words ‘or denied the right to change his nationality’ should be added 
to the India-United Kingdom amendment.”); U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 59th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.59 (June 4, 1948) (statement of Mr. Malik, Lebanon) (“No one should be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality or of the right to change his nationality.”) (amendment was adopted on 
vote); U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 14th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.14 (Feb. 5, 1947) (statement 
of Mr. Mora, Uruguay) (“The right to freedom of movement ought also to include the freedom to 
change one’s nationality.”) (accepted without opposition); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n. 
on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, C.L.C. 
Mubanga-Chipoya (Rapporteur), Final Rep. on Analysis of the Current Trends and Developments 
Regarding the Right to Leave any Country Including One’s Own, and to Return to One’s Own 
Country, and Some Other Rights or Consideration Arising Therefrom, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2 (Part 1) (July 10, 1987) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Final Rep.] 
(documenting France’s support of the U.K. proposal to include renunciation: “Subject to any 
general law adopted in the interest of national welfare and security, there shall be liberty of 
movement and free choice of residence within the borders of each State; individuals may also freely 
emigrate or expatriate themselves.”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Professor H. Lauterpacht (Rapporteur), Prelim. Rep. on Human Rights, the Charter of the United 
Nations and the International Bill of the Rights of Man, at 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/89 (May 12, 1948) 
(“Article 9 . . . The right of emigration and expatriation shall not be denied.”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Comments from Governments on the Draft International 
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reference to the right of the individual’s decision.35 And, important for this 
Paper, the right to change nationality was continually linked to the right to leave 
any state generally, phrased broadly as the right to “emigrate.”36 
Unfortunately, the UDHR is not a binding instrument like a treaty;37 
however, the rights contained in the UDHR were later implemented in a binding 
treaty: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). The 
text of the ICCPR, however, does not contain the right to change nationality 
explicitly. It reads in part: “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, 
including his own.”38 Various special rapporteurs on the right to leave have 
consistently held that the right to leave in the ICCPR was linked to human rights 
in the UDHR.39 Subsequently, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) held that 
the freedom to leave is not limited to any specific purpose.40 Scholars have 
 
Declaration on Human Rights, Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the Question 
of Implementation, Communication from the United Kingdom, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.9 
(May 10, 1948) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Communication from the United Kingdom] 
(“Article 10(2) . . . His Majesty’s Government have assumed that it aims at ensuring that ‘everyone 
has the right to divest himself of his nationality, if he wishes to do so.’ His Majesty’s Government 
are not convinced of the need to include a provision covering the above point.”). 
 35. See Draft International Declaration of Human Rights (Draft United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights), art. 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/148/Add.1, annex A (June 18, 1948) (“No one should 
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or denied the right to change his nationality.”); U.N. Econ. 
& Soc. Council, Communication from the United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 4. 
 36. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention 
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Joseph Nisot (Rapporteur), Report Submitted to 
Commission on Human Rights, Draft Declaration of Human Rights, at 6–7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/52 
(Dec. 6, 1947); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n. on Human Rights, Proposal for a Human 
Rights Convention Submitted by the Representative of the United States on the Commission on 
Human Rights, art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/37 (Nov. 26, 1947) (“Everyone shall have the right to 
emigrate.”). 
 37. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 32, at pmbl. 
 38. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 12(2) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 39. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention 
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Paper on the Right to Freedom of Movement and 
Related Issues Prepared by Mr. Volodymyr Boutkevitch in Implementation of Decision 1996/109 
of the Sub-Commission, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/22 (July 29, 1997) (finding that ICCPR 
Article 15 is linked to the UDHR); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n. on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, José D. Inglés (Special 
Rapporteur), Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country 
and to Return to His Country, at 11, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963) (“The right to 
change one’s nationality presupposes the right to leave one’s country.”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Final Rep., supra note 34, ¶ 70. 
 40. See Varela Núñez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 108/1981, ¶ 9.3 (July 22, 1983), 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS COMM.: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 
143, 145 ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.1 (1990); Lichtensztejn v. 
Uruguay, Communication No. 77/1980, ¶ 8.4 (Mar. 31, 1983), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMM.: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 102, 104–05, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.1 (1990); Pereira Montera v. Uruguay, Communication 
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studied the ICCPR and its implementation and concluded that the permissible 
purposes can include expatriation;41 in fact, expatriation is a form of leaving.42 
Unlike the UDHR, some of the rights in the ICCPR can be limited. Any 
limitation on a right must be necessary in democratic society (proportionate)43 
for protecting national security,44 public order,45 public health46 or morals,47 and 
the rights and freedoms of others,48 and not otherwise inconsistent with other 
rights in the ICCPR.49 Based on this analysis, the right to leave may be limited 
by mental capacity,50 pending judicial proceedings,51 the need to serve a prison 
 
No. 106/1981, ¶ 9.4 (Mar. 31, 1983), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS COMM.: SELECTED DECISIONS 
UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 136, 138, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. 
E.84.XIV.1 (1990); Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, Communication No. 57/1979, ¶ 7 (Mar. 23, 1982), 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS COMM.: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 
122, 123, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 (1985); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 27] (“Freedom to 
leave the territory of a State may not be made dependent on any specific purpose . . . .”). 
 41. See SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 355 (2d 
ed. 2005) (“The right to leave one’s country pertains to both short or longer visits and the freedom 
to leave, semi-permanently, or to emigrate.”). 
 42. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 267 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (“The right to leave a country covers both brief and 
somewhat more extended stays abroad . . . and long-term departure from a country with or without 
surrender of citizenship (freedom to emigrate).”). 
 43. Id. at 274. 
 44. See Karker v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 833/1998, ¶¶ 9.2, 
9.3, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/833/1998 (2000); González del Río v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Communication No. 263/1987, ¶ 5.3 (Oct. 28, 1992), reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, 1992/93, at 516, U.N. Doc. CCPR/12/Add.1 (Vol. II), U.N. 
Sales No. E.96.XIV.2 (1997); Celepli v. Sweden, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
456/1991, ¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 (1994); General Comment No. 27, supra note 
40, ¶ 11. 
 45. See González del Río, ¶ 5.3; General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 11. 
 46. See Bhinder v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 208/1986, ¶¶ 
4.2, 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/37/D/208/1986 (1989); General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 
11. 
 47. See Hertzberg et al. v. Finland, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 61/1979, 
¶¶ 6.3, 10.4 (Apr. 2, 1982), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS COMM.: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER 
THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 124, 126, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 
(1985); General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 11. 
 48. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 11. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See NOWAK, supra note 42, at 268–70. 
 51. See González del Río v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 263/1987, 
¶ 5.3 (Oct. 28, 1992), reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, 
1992/93, at 516, U.N. Doc. CCPR/12/Add.1 (Vol. II), U.N. Sales No. E.96.XIV.2 (1997); NOWAK, 
supra note 42, at 270. 
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sentence,52 an obligation to provide military/national service,53 or the refusal to 
pay lawfully incurred taxes.54 That being said, the right to renounce nationality 
expressed in the European Convention on Nationality would prohibit these 
measures because refusing renunciation of nationality is not strictly necessary to 
achieve these ends.55 
However, the HRC has held that exit or travel visas do violate the right to 
leave, even when it is (theoretically) possible to acquire one.56 In addition, 
burdensome fees or administrative costs applying to exercise this right57 (e.g., 
passport application fees)58 that go beyond the administrative expense are also 
violations because they are not necessary.59 In general, the argument that the 
individual owes the state an obligation has been viewed skeptically because: “As 
shown by the practice of many States, governments have a keen interest in 
preventing their working population or certain groups . . . from leaving the 
country. It is always possible to come up with some sort of ‘debt’ owed the State 
. . . .”60 
In addition to treaty law, we can consider customary international law and 
its interaction with the right to change nationality.61 In order to determine if a 
 
 52. See NOWAK, supra note 42, at 270. 
 53. See Peltonen v. Finland, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 492/92, ¶ 8.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/492/1992 (July 21, 1994). But see U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Comments of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995). 
 54. See NOWAK, supra note 42, at 270. 
 55. See Riener v. Bulgaria, App. No. 46343/99, ¶ 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 2006); Council 
of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Nationality, E.T.S. No. 166, ¶¶ 78, 81 (May 
14, 1997). 
 56. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
Uzbekistan, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3 (Apr. 7, 2010) (criticizing the requirement of an 
exit visa); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Turkmenistan, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TKM/CO/1 (Apr. 19, 2012); U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Gabon, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.71 (Nov. 18, 1996); NOWAK, supra note 42, at 269–70. 
 57. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 17. 
 58. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Iraq, 
¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.84 (Nov. 19, 1997). 
 59. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 17; NOWAK, supra note 42, at 279. 
 60. NOWAK, supra note 42, at 278. 
 61. If the reader concludes, however, that this author has not succeeded in establishing 
widepsread and consistent practice with opinio juris, then the author also submits that the vast 
amount of state practice could be seen as subsequent practice for purposes of interpreting the 
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rule exists under customary international law, we have to establish a sufficient 
amount of state practice with opinio juris.62 When the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) has studied this question of a human right to renunciation, 
it has repeatedly reached the same conclusion that there was a right to 
renounce.63 The U.N. Secretariat has reached the same conclusion.64 The 
Institute of International Law as long ago as 1896,65 and the International Law 
Association as long ago as 1924,66 recognized the right to expatriate. Classic 
authors of public international law have also argued in favor of a right to 
renounce nationality as a human right.67 The only restriction the ILC could find 
 
ICCPR. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 340. 
 62. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 100, ¶ 
55 (Feb. 3); Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 27–30 (June 3); North 
Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20); S.S. 
“Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 98, 101 (Sept. 7); Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Michael Wood, (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Formation and Evidence of 
Customary International Law, ¶¶ 13–15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May, 17 2013); INT’L LAW 
ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE 
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 8–11 (2000). 
 63. See F.V. García Amador (Special Rapporteur), Report on International Responsibility, ¶ 
108, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 173, 194, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. 1956.V.3, Vol. II (observing that “existing laws of 
progressive, enlightened civilization” provide for a right to expatriate); Manley O. Hudson (Special 
Rapporteur), Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/50 (Feb. 21, 1952), 
reprinted in [1952] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 3, 9, 11, 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1952/Add.1 
(recognizing right to renounce nationality). But see U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, SURVEY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO THE WORK OF CODIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. 1948.V.1(1) (1949) (“[N]o 
agreement proved possible on important questions of substance such as . . . the right of 
expatriation.”). 
 64. The U.N. Secretariat, in preparing a study on nationality for the International Law 
Commission, noted that the “right to expatriation and to change nationality has long been 
recognized as an inherent right of the human person at least by certain countries.” U.N. Secretariat, 
Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality, ¶¶ 37, 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/84 (May 14, 1954), 
reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, 61, 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1. 
 65. See 15 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 32, 131 (1896). 
 66. See Ernest J. Schuster & Wyndham A. Bewes, Report of the Committee on Nationality 
and Naturalisation, in INT’L LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE 22, 32 
(1925). 
 67. See HENRY BONFILS, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC § 410, at 269 (Librairie 
Rousseau 7th ed., 1914) (Fr.); DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE § 
267, at 138 (London, Trübner & Co. 2d ed. 1876) (“Expatriation does not change the national 
character of the person until completed by naturalization, but meantime he is entitled to be protected 
by the country whose naturalization he is seeking.”); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS III, at 90, 91 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute 1916) 
(1758) (“There are certain cases under which a citizen has the absolute right . . . to renounce 
allegiance to his country and abandon it. . . . If the sovereign undertakes to interfere with those who 
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on renunciation was to prevent the individual from becoming stateless.68 
Suggestions that exit visas might be acceptable were rejected.69 The U.N. 
Secretariat opined that another possible exception to that right would be 
individuals subject to a military service obligation.70 
In addition to the UDHR and ICCPR mentioned above, we also have 
numerous other binding and non-binding resolutions and declarations 
reaffirming the right to change nationality. Beginning with binding law, the 
Migrant Worker Convention, Racial Discrimination Convention, Apartheid 
Convention, Rights of the Child Convention, all support the right to freedom to 
leave and/or emigrate.71 The Convention on the Rights of the Child protects the 
child’s right to form his identity, which some authorities have viewed as 
overlapping with nationality.72 In Europe, the European Convention on 
 
have the right to emigrate he does them a wrong . . . .”); FRANCISCI DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE 
JURE BELLI RELECTIONES 386 (John P. Bate trans. 1917) (1557) (“[I]t was permissible from the 
beginning of the world . . . for any one to set forth and travel wheresoever he would.”); U.N. 
Secretariat, Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality, supra note 64, ¶ 312 bis. For more 
contemporary authors, see Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 115, 149–52 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Rosalyn Higgins, The 
Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in and Leave a Country, 49 INT’L AFF. 
341, 341–42, 352–53 (1973). 
 68. See Hudson, supra note 63, at 14, 21 (recognizing the only valid prohibition on 
renunciation should be to avoid statelessness). 
 69. See Summary Records of the 218th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B/ Int’l L. Comm’n 220, 222, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (discussing the draft convention on the elimination of future 
statelessness and objections to the implication that states can require an exit permit for 
renunciation). 
 70. See U.N. Secretariat, Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality, supra note 64, ¶ 374 
(“The right of expatriation is now recognized by most States, although with certain restrictions in 
respect of individuals subject to military obligations; and in most municipal laws loss of the 
nationality of origin is the consequence of naturalization by a foreign State upon request of the 
individual concerned.”). 
 71. See G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, at art. 5(d)(ii) (Dec. 21, 1965) (“State Parties undertake to . . . guarantee the 
right . . . to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s country . . . .”). 
 72. See Riener v. Bulgaria, App. No. 46343/99, at 31–32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 2006) 
(Maruste, J., dissenting) (“[In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights] . . . I see 
nationality (citizenship) as part of someone’s identity. If Article 8 covers the right to self-
determination in respect of, for example, sexual orientation and so forth, it undoubtedly also covers 
the right to self-determination in respect of nationality and citizenship. It is true that the Convention 
does not guarantee the right to citizenship. But it follows from the general idea of freedom, freedom 
of choice and self-determination that there should be a right to apply for citizenship and also a 
negative right to renounce it. This is part of the social, cultural and political self-determination of 
the individual which, to my mind, also falls within the general scope of Article 8.”); G.A. Res. 32/5, 
Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, ¶ 11 (June 30, 2016) (“Reiterates that the 
right to identity is intimately linked to the right of nationality . . . .”); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of 
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General: Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Rep. of the 
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Nationality obliges states to permit renunciation as a human right,73 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights protections on private life might also 
treat renunciation similarly as a human right.74 
Turning to non-binding instruments that would demonstrate opinio juris, we 
can observe that the right to renounce nationality has been acknowledged in 
international meetings and fora for a long time with a high degree of 
consistency.75 For example, the Uppsala Declaration affirmed that all people 
enjoyed the human right to renounce nationality,76 and this declaration was cited 
in other studies on the rights in the UDHR and ICCPR. 
Turning to specific instances of state practice, voluntary renunciation of 
nationality is essentially universally recognized as a right. Specifically, it is 
included in the law on nationality of 172 states. This is a remarkable concurrence 
of opinion. Only one state prohibits renunciation of nationality completely: 
Costa Rica.77 However, the reason for this choice is that Costa Rica has a 
constitutional provision against the creation of situations of statelessness.78 The 
 
Secretary-General, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-
General, Annual Report] (“Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
expressly stipulates: ‘Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her 
identity [including nationality], States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, 
with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.’”). 
 73. European Convention on Nationality, art. 8, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. No. 166. 
Article 8 – Loss of nationality at the initiative of the individual 
1. Each State Party shall permit the renunciation of its nationality provided the persons 
concerned do not thereby become stateless. 
2. However, a State Party may provide in its internal law that renunciation may be effected 
only by nationals who are habitually resident abroad. 
Id.; see also Riener v. Bulgaria, App. No. 46343/99, ¶ 89 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 2006). 
 74. See Ramadan v. Malta, App. No. 76136/12, ¶ 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 2016) (Pinto de 
Albuquerque, J., dissenting) (“There is nothing to suggest that the above principle cannot apply to 
cases of deprivation or loss of citizenship or to the right to renounce citizenship.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, 29 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1305, 1311 (1990); Human Rights in the 
Concluding Document of the Vienna: CSCE Follow-up Meeting on 15 January 1989, 10 HUM. RTS. 
L.J. 270, 277 (1989); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Final Rep., supra note 34, ¶¶ 61, 121–22. 
 76. See The Right to Leave and the Right to Return: A Declaration Adopted by the Uppsala 
Colloquium, Sweden, June 21, 1972, 7 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 62, 63 (1973) (linking the right to 
leave and the right to renounce nationality: “Article 3: (a) No person shall be required to renounce 
his nationality as a condition of the exercise of the right to leave a country. (b) No person shall be 
deprived of his nationality for seeking to exercise or for exercising the right to leave a country. (c) 
No person shall be denied the right to leave a country because he wishes to renounce or has 
renounced his nationality.”). 
 77. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE COSTA RICA [CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA] arts. 16–17. 
 78. See U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report, supra note 72, ¶ 18 (“The Government of 
Costa Rica stated that the Constitution guarantees the right to a nationality, also recognized in 
international instruments to which Costa Rica is party. . . . Article 16 further indicates that Costa 
Rican citizenship cannot be lost or renounced. The Government stated that the Constitutional Court 
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P.R. China only prohibits renunciation outright for military officers and 
government officials.79 However, many states, including for example, the 
United States, have long argued that expatriation is a human right.80 Based on 
this survey, the right to renounce nationality is certainly widespread and 
consistent. This conclusion, combined with the international concern and 
existence of the right in the UDHR and inherently in the ICCPR, suggests that 
the right to renounce nationality also exists under customary international law.  
Following the existence of this right, we next consider whether it may be 
limited. No authority suggested that the right to expatriate is norm of jus cogens, 
so it must be subject to some limitation. In a number of states, there are a few 
reasonable restrictions to renunciation. The most common is the avoidance of 
statelessness by requiring a substitute nationality.81 This requirement is certainly 
reasonable since states are under an obligation to avoid the creation of 
statelessness.82 Even states that do not specify this reason for prohibiting 
 
has further clarified that this clause on non-renunciation should be interpreted in conformity with 
international human rights as an absolute prohibition on statelessness.”). 
 79. See NATIONALITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 12 (Sept. 10, 1980), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/LivinginChina/184710.htm# [https://perma.cc/577J-4A7W]. 
 80. See U.N. Secretary General, Rep. on Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Nationality, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/56 (Dec. 28, 1998) (citing response from the United 
States (Oct. 9, 1998): “The United States, however, has recognized the right of expatriation as an 
inherent right of all people.”); see also William Thomas Worster, The Constitutionality of the 
Taxation Consequences for Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 921, 967–68 (2010). 
 81. See Bulgarian Citizenship Act art. 20, http://www.bulgarianembassy-london.org/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107 [https://perma.cc/AY5N-SBUV]; Andorra, in U.S. 
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE WORLD 16, 16 (2001) [hereinafter OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS], http://www.multiplecitizenship.com/documents/IS-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C9PD-8V4E]; Austria, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 24, 24; Belgium, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 
31, 31; Botswana, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 38, 38; Chile, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 50, 50; 
Denmark, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 64, 64; Germany, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 82, 82; New 
Zealand, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 145, 145; Norway, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 150, 150; 
Papua New Guinea, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 156, 156; Philippines, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 
159, 159; Russian Federation, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 164, 165; Slovak Republic, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS 177, 177; Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 178, 178; Sweden, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS 189, 189; Switzerland, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS 190, 190. 
 82. See, e.g., Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, League of Nations Doc. C.224.M.III.1930.V (1930); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 21 (1978); PAUL 
WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32, 45–46, 125 (reprint 1979) 
(1956); William Thomas Worster, International Law and the Expulsion of Individuals with More 
than One Nationality, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 423, 427, 451–52 (2009). But see 
generally Davis v. Dist. Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1179–80, 
1181–82 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that renunciation of U.S. citizenship without a pre-existing dual 
citizenship, rendering person stateless, was nonetheless effective). But see John L.A. de 
Passalacqua, Voluntary Renunciation of United States Citizenship by Puerto Rican Nationals, 66 
REVISTA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO [U.P.R. LEGAL REV.] 269, 289 n.73 
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renunciation might have an international legal obligation to do so. Other 
restrictions include being at least a certain age83 (or simply having full mental 
capacity),84 not being under criminal investigation,85 or having some form of 
unfulfilled duties to the state86 (such as military service obligations87 or unpaid 
taxes88), maintaining a foreign residency,89 that the renunciation ceremony 
 
(1997) (noting that Davis was decided before the United States become a party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
 83. See Iran, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 97, 97; New Zealand, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 145; Palau, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 
153, 153; Papua New Guinea, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 156; St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 169, 169; Singapore, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 176, 176; Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 
81, at 178; Switzerland, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 190. 
 84. See New Zealand, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 145. 
 85. See Law on Albanian Citizenship art. 15(4), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5c 
10.html [https://perma.cc/85DN-S635]; Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship art. 20, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5960.html [https://perma.cc/9DFC-9EGA]; Act No. 21/1991 
on Romanian Citizenship art. 27(a), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b50218.html [https://per 
ma.cc/4ZJB-ZCMV]; Law on Ukrainian Citizenship art. 18, http://www.legislationline.org/docu 
ments/action/popup/id/7179 [https://perma.cc/Y9T5-NR9W]; Armenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 20, 21; Austria, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 24; Belarus, 
in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 30, 30; Greece, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra 
note 81, at 84, 84; Russian Federation, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 165; Slovak 
Republic, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 177; Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, 
supra note 81, at 178; Vietnam, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 214, 214. 
 86. See Law on Albanian Citizenship art. 15(5); Finnish Nationality Act § 35(1), 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030359.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D2M-P8BU]; 
Armenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 21; Belarus, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, 
supra note 81, at 30; Estonia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 74, 74; Iran, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 97; Latvia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 
115, 115; Russian Federation, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 165. 
 87. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA art. 56(2); CODE CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 23-2 (Fr.); U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Ger., Dual Nationality, U.S. EMBASSY, https://de.us 
embassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/dual-nationality/ [https://perma.cc/9U9U-KQ5X] (“[A] German 
citizen may not give up citizenship to avoid . . . military service.”); Austria, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 24; Croatia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 59, 59; Estonia, 
in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 74; Greece, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 
81, at 84; Iran, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 97; Latvia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 115; Russian Federation, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 
165; Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 178; Vietnam, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 214. 
 88. See Act No. 21/1991 on Romanian Citizenship art. 27(b); Croatia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 59; Slovak Republic, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 177; 
Vietnam, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 214. 
 89. See NATIONALITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 8 (Sept.10, 1980), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/LivinginChina/184710.htm# [https://perma.cc/577J-4A7W]; 
Andorra, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 16; Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, 
supra note 81, at 178; Switzerland, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 190. 
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occur in the country,90 and national security issues generally.91 Armenia, 
Slovakia Republic, and Slovenia also block renunciation when the individual 
has outstanding obligations to private organizations or persons.92 In terms of 
processing restrictions, some states assess a significant fee,93 and a few states 
reserve some form of residual power over renunciation such as requiring a 
ministerial act, court decree, or other governmental approval.94 Usually the state 
must approve these applications,95 although three states actively frustrate the 
renunciation process, making the approval process almost impossible: Iran,96 
North Korea, 97 and Syria.98 Nonetheless, those states still provide for the right 
to renounce in law, affirming the norm.99 
In sum, the right to renounce nationality is virtually universally affirmed, 
and there are only several permissible limitations. Certainly, it is permissible to 
 
 90. See Andorra, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 16; Argentina, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 19, 19; Haiti, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 
90, 90; Vietnam, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 214. 
 91. See Armenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 21. 
 92. See id. (“[Renunciation is blocked] if the person has unfulfilled duties connected with the 
interests of the state, enterprises, organizations, or citizens.”); Slovak Republic, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 177 (blocking renunciation if “delinquent in . . . debts”); 
Slovenia, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 178 (blocking renunciation if debts and 
legal obligations have not been satisfied). 
 93. See Jordan, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 104, 104; South Korea, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 110, 110. 
 94. See Bhutan, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 35, 35; Burundi, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 43, 43; Cuba, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 
60, 60; Egypt, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 69, 69; Greece, in OPM CITIZENSHIP 
LAWS, supra note 81, at 84; Iran, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 97; Jamaica, in 
OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 102, 102; Jordan, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra 
note 81, at 104; North Korea, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 109, 109; Laos, in 
OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 114, 114; Lebanon, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra 
note 81, at 117, 117; Maldives, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 127, 127; Mongolia, 
in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 137, 137; Morocco, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, 
supra note 81, at 138, 138; Poland, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 160, 160; Tunisia, 
in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 201, 201. 
 95. See Laos, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 114; Morocco, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 138. 
 96. See Iran, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 97 (“[P]ractical experiences have 
shown that Council permission is difficult to obtain, thus hindering legal renunciation of Iranian 
citizenship.”). 
 97. See North Korea, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 109 (“Voluntary 
renunciation of North Korean Citizenship is technically possible . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 98. See Syria, in OPM CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 192, 192 (“Though voluntary 
renunciation of Syrian citizenship is permitted by law, the Syrian Information Office stated that it 
is so complicated that it is best not to attempt the process.”). 
 99. Some authorities might also include Morocco on this list. See Morocco, in OPM 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS, supra note 81, at 138 (“Renunciation is not automatic and must be approved 
by the Ministry of Justice.”). 
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refuse renunciation in order to prevent statelessness.100 Having a certain mental 
capacity seems a minor inconvenience to prevent a catastrophic error. However, 
the vague category of unfilled duties to the state is problematic. Only a few states 
consider unpaid taxes as a limitation on renunciation, and it is difficult to 
understand how limiting renunciation is necessary for a state to recover unpaid 
revenue, other than the obvious coercion involved. It might be possible for a 
state to restrict renunciation for those subject to current military service 
obligations, although the case for that measure is weak,101 as it is for being under 
a criminal investigation. In order to be truly necessary, such limitations probably 
only need to apply to the right to leave, not necessarily the right to renounce 
nationality. It could be argued that for individuals abroad, renunciation could 
result in loss of jurisdiction over the person under investigation and renunciation 
might be prohibited lawfully on that basis. Exit visas are clearly prohibited, 
unless it is a purely ministerial action that does not involve any discretion on the 
part of the authority.102 A very few number of states assess a fee for renunciation, 
showing that it is out of the norm, and, following the HRC, any fee that goes 
beyond the administrative costs would be unlawfully burdening the underlying 
right.103 
III.  COMPLIANCE OF U.S. EXIT TAXES WITH THE RIGHT TO RENOUNCE 
NATIONALITY 
Finally, we turn to whether the U.S. exit regime is in compliance with the 
right to renounce nationality as discussed in this Paper. Detlev Vagts has argued 
that the exit tax is not a human rights violation.104 He argued that the taxes are 
not due to emigration but due to expatriation, which in his view was not a 
protected right.105 Implicitly then, if this author can establish that the right to 
renounce nationality is protected, either on its own or as part of the right to leave, 
then Vagts’ position would fail. The difficulty with his argument is that he does 
not admit that the right to renounce nationality under the ICCPR is a part of the 
 
 100. See Hudson, supra note 63, at 14, 21 (recognizing the only valid prohibition on 
renunciation should be to avoid statelessness). 
 101. See U.N. Secretariat, Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality, supra note 64, ¶ 374 
(“The right of expatriation is now recognized by most States, although with certain restrictions in 
respect of individuals subject to military obligations; and in most municipal laws loss of the 
nationality of origin is the consequence of naturalization by a foreign State upon request of the 
individual concerned.”). 
 102. Summary Records of the 218th Meeting, supra note 69, at 222 (discussing the draft 
convention on the elimination of future statelessness and objections to the implication that states 
can require an exit permit for renunciation). 
 103. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 40, ¶ 17; NOWAK, supra note 42, at 279. 
 104. See Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, The Proposed Expatriation Tax—A Human 
Rights Violation?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 580 (1995). 
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general right to leave; he limits the right to leave to physical movement,106 when 
in fact the history of the right shows that it contemplates a range of separation 
from a state including short-term visits to permanent expatriation. In addition, 
he does not address the existence of the right under customary international law. 
The U.S. State Department opined that the U.S. expatriation tax did not 
violate international human rights law stating specifically “that such 
[expatriation] taxes would not be more burdensome than those [the expatriates] 
would pay if they were to remain U.S. citizens (or residents).”107 This argument 
misses the point because it compares the wrong variables. If the right to 
expatriate is meaningful, then it means the right to be a non-citizen—an alien. 
Thus, the comparison should be between the taxes paid by non-citizens and those 
paid by non-citizens who have exercised their fundamental human right to 
expatriate. Clearly, these tax rates are different. 
The exit tax is certainly not an outright ban on expatriation. However, the 
right to expatriation and the case law discussed above shows that consequences 
from the act are also prohibited, for example, imposing burdensome 
administrative costs to exercise this right.108 In this case, the United States is 
imposing taxes on persons who are not U.S. nationals and not residents, and not 
otherwise subject to taxation. It is imposing the tax on these persons as a direct 
consequence of the decision to renounce nationality—a protected right. Thus, it 
is an infringement. 
Then, the question is whether this infringement is justified. The exit tax is 
not a measure to prohibit renunciation of nationality due to concerns over 
statelessness, mental capacity, military service, or criminal investigation, so it is 
not clearly permissible. While blocking renunciation might be permissible to 
recover unpaid taxes, the U.S. exit tax regime does not argue that the taxes are 
incurred prior to the moment the person attempts expatriation. It is also not an 
exit visa, so it is not clearly prohibited. It appears that the exit tax is an effort to 
either apply a bona fide effort to recover benefits the expatriate accrued during 
the time he or she was a U.S. citizen, or perhaps a mala fide effort to punish the 
act of renunciation. 
Insofar as there may be a mala fide motivation, the right to expatriation 
clearly prohibits any taxation consequence on this scale. The intent in adopting 
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expatriation taxes is relatively clear. The U.S. Department of the Treasury says 
that the exit tax is an effort to deter or punish tax-motivated expatriation,109 and 
courts have agreed that this tax is “enacted to forestall tax-motivated 
expatriation.”110 As this justification does not invoke one of the permitted 
necessary grounds (national security,111 public order,112 public health113 or 
morals,114 and the rights and freedoms of others115), it must fail. 
Insofar as the effort is aimed at imposing taxation on benefits accrued, the 
human rights test seems to also prohibit it. Essentially, the exit tax regime is 
attempting to tax the increase in value of assets during the time a person was a 
U.S. citizen. The question is whether this purpose is a permitted one under 
international human rights law. Perhaps it is interesting to observe that 
individuals already receive a stepped-up basis when inheriting assets and are not 
obliged to pay taxes on the appreciation. This policy shows that imposing 
taxation on appreciated assets is not a compelling interest. Even if it were 
compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny under U.S. constitutional law, it is 
quite a stretch to argue that taxing the increased value of certain assets amounts 
to matters of national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights 
and freedoms of others. This concern harkens back to the observation of 
Manfred Nowak that states can always find obligations that an individual owes 
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to the state as a means of preventing persons from leaving.116 Thus, the exit tax 
does not serve a compelling interest, so whether it is necessary in a democratic 
society117 for a justifiable purpose is not considered, and the taxation regime 
cannot be justified. 
CONCLUSION 
This Paper has assessed whether taxes imposed on expatriation 
(renunciation of citizenship), sometimes referred to as “exit taxes,” are in 
compliance with international human rights law.  
The first question is whether there is a right to expatriate. The UDHR states 
that every person has a human right to change his nationality, but this declaration 
is not binding. The ICCPR protects the right of an individual to leave any 
country, including his own, but not explicitly the right to renounce nationality. 
However, the UDHR has been understood to contain binding obligations, though 
the declaration itself is not formally binding, and the right in the ICCPR can 
contain the notion of expatriation within the broad meaning of leaving a state. 
In addition, the negotiation history of both shows that the right to renounce 
nationality was certainly considered and understood to form a part of the right 
to leave. In addition, customary international law, both on its own and in relation 
to the UDHR and ICCPR, supports the right to expatriate. There is a widespread 
and consistent state practice of providing for a right to renounce nationality and 
clear expressions of opinio juris that this right is obligatory. 
The second question is whether the U.S. exit tax can be justified as an 
acceptable derogation from the right to renounce nationality. The right to 
expatriate tracks the right to leave generally in permitting exceptions. This right 
may be limited as is necessary in a democratic society in order to protect national 
security, public order, public health or morals, and the rights and freedoms of 
others. Unfortunately, while the imposition of exit taxes does chill the exercise 
of the right to expatriate, these taxes cannot be justified under any of these goals, 
and thus are certainly not necessary. Therefore, the taxes imposed on persons 
exercising their right to renounce their nationality infringe human rights. 
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